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Conflicts-of-Interest Disqualification
in Medical Malpractice Litigation
by George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
Less than two decades ago it was
thought sufficient to say, "When a
practitioner is in doubt on an ethical
question, the best answer is usually
No."1 A more recent commentator has
suggested, however, that "[s]uch plati-
tudes have become increasingly inad-
equate to guide the attorney facing
conflicts of interests in the private
practice of law."2 Because of the gen-
eral vagueness of the American Bar
Association's Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, and of state
codes based on it, courts have begun
to fashion a vast "common law" of
conflicts of interest 3 A particularly
controversial entry to this body of
common law is the opinion of Justice
Paul Liacos, sitting as single justice in
the Massachusetts case of White v.
Kaplan.' This article examines the
opinion and its theoretical support.
The Facts
Robert and Elaine White filed a mal-
practice suit against Dr. L. Fredrick
Kaplan for his alleged failure to prop-
erly diagnose a tracheal tumor. At the
September 1979 tribunal, Dr. Kaplan
was represented by Attorney Peter C.
Knight, and the Whites presented the
expert opinion of Dr. Daniel Zoll in
support of their suit. In January 1980,
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in answer to interrogatories, the
Whites again identified Dr. Zoll as
their expert witness for trial.
In September 1980, Attorney Knight
agreed to represent Dr. Zoll as de-
fendant in an unrelated malpractice
suit alleging that he negligently
treated a foot wound caused by a
piece of glass. In February 1982, Dr.
Zoll's deposition was taken by the
Whites' attorney (by this time Attor-
ney Knight knew that he had under-
taken to represent their expert wit-
ness in a separate matter). The Whites
obtained new counsel for their suit in
June 1983, and this attorney moved to
disqualify Knight as the lawyer for
Defendant Kaplan, on the basis that
Knight had a conflict of interest in
that he represented the Whites' ex-
pert witness in another malpractice
matter. The trial judge thought he
lacked the jurisdiction to compel de-
fense counsel to withdraw, and the
case was taken before Justice Liacos
for resolution.
The Opinion
Justice Liacos sought to balance the
interests of each party in a manner
consistent with "the spirit of Canon 4"
and "the perimeters of Canon 9" of
the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.5
When explicit ethical guidance
does not exist, a lawyer should
determine his conduct in a man-
ner that promotes public confi-
dence in the integrity and effi-
ciency of the legal system and
the legal profession [EC 9-2].
... Canon 4 states, "A lawyer
should preserve the confidences
and secrets of a client" and disci-
plinary rule 4-101(b) states, "a
lawyer shall not knowingly...
use a confidence or secret of his
client to the disadvantage of the
client ... [or] use a confidence or
secret of his client for the advan-
tage of himself or of a third per-
son unless the client consents
after full disclosure."6
Justice Liacos also cited Canon 9's in-
junction that "[a] lawyer should avoid
even the appearance of professional
impropriety" in order to protect the
public's interest in the scrupulous ad-
ministration of justice.' He balanced
these basic, but vague, principles
against the litigant's right to the coun-
sel of his choice.
Justice Liacos concluded that there
were two possible ways in which the
dual representation at issue might
give rise to an unacceptable conflict
of interest. Both involved the cross-
examination of the client in his role
as expert witness in the White case.
One of two things might happen: "(a)
the attorney may be tempted to use
... confidential information to im-
peach the witness; or (b) [the attor-
ney] may fail to conduct a rigorous
cross-examination for fear of misusing
his confidential information."8
This argument would have been
stronger had there been some indica-
tion of what specific confidential in-
formation might have been involved,
but Justice Liacos was content to note
simply, in a footnote, that "while
these cases may involve different
bases for their respective claims, they
both involve medical malpractice.
The credibility, reputation and com-
petence of both doctors will be in is-
sue at Dr. Kaplan's trial."9 Following
this line of argument, Justice Liacos
concluded that a breach of confi-
dence need not be proven but only
presumed, "in order to preserve the
spirit of the code. "' ° In his words: "It
is difficult to see how Mr. Knight
could avoid, even unconsciously, the
use of information acquired because
of the attorney-client relationship
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with Dr. Zoll to impeach Dr. Zoll's
credibility.""
Two other issues were considered:
the defense of consent and the use of
disqualification as a litigation tactic.
Justice Liacos dismissed the consent
defense by giving more weight to the
"public trust in the notions of funda-
mental fairness and justice, and in the
integrity of the bar." 2 The justice saw
the possibility that Dr. Kaplan would
gain "an unfair advantage" as espe-
cially troublesome, and viewed dis-
qualification as the appropriate rem-
edy to protect the public's "faith in
justice." 3 Likewise, although recog-
nizing the costs to all parties of using
disqualification as an offensive
weapon, Justice Liacos again con-
cluded that protection of the "integ-
rity of our judicial system" was an in-
terest to which "Dr. Kaplan's right to
counsel" must yield.' " In a footnote,
Justice Liacos suggested that Mr.
Knight should have withdrawn imme-
diately as Dr. Kaplan's counsel upon
learning of the conflict, in order to
enable Dr. Kaplan to find substitute
counsel, or should have "at least" in-
formed the Whites so they could de-
cide whether to continue to retain Dr.
Zoll as their expert."
Was Justice Liacos Right?
Justice Liacos' opinion has been criti-
cized on a number of grounds. The
most important are that it is unprece-
dented; that it disregards the consent
of Mr. Knight's clients to dual repre-
sentation; that it takes little account of
the client's right to choose his or her
own lawyer; and that as a matter of
efficiency, it would have been easier
for the plaintiffs to obtain a new ex-
pert witness than for the defendant to
obtain a new lawyer. The latter rem-
edy, the critics contend, should have
been pursued to discourage plaintiffs'
attorneys from using disqualification
as a tactic.
The Precedents
The basic model for conflicts of inter-
est involves representing clients with
conflicting interests, either in the
same case or in different cases. Thus
an attorney cannot represent both par-
ties (P1 and D1) in lawsuit A, or rep-
resent one party in lawsuit A (P1) and
the adverse party in lawsuit A (D1) in
lawsuit B, or switch clients in law-
suit A.
This traditional model was not, of
course, at issue in White. Rather, here
an attorney represented a party in
The aim of disqualification is
not the retrospective sanc-
tioning of the attorney or
the granting of a new trial
but the prospective protec-
tion of the integrity of the
legal process itself.
lawsuit A (D1) and a completely dif-
ferent party in an unrelated lawsuit B
(D2), who also happened to be an
adverse witness to DI in lawsuit A.
The generic question is: How close is
this "adverse witness model" to the
traditionally forbidden one? The an-
swer depends on the ways in which
the attorney could use his relation-
ship with D2 to the advantage of D1
and, thus, to the unfair disadvantage
of P1. Hypothetically, the attorney
could use some confidential informa-
tion gained from D2 in cross-examin-
ing D2 in lawsuit 1, to the advantage
of D1 and the disadvantage of P1.
Such use of confidential information
would be unfair to P1 and would taint
the adversarial process. Likewise, fail-
ure to conduct as vigorous a cross-
examination of D2 as possible in law-
suit 1 would disadvantage D1, and
would evidence a "split of loyalties,"
again tainting the trial:
Conflicts of interest threaten to
taint a trial in two ways, each of
which upsets the adversarial bal-
ance. First, an attorney may turn
confidences acquired in the rep-
resentation of his present adver-
sary to unfair advantage for his
client. Such conduct too closely
parallels the proscribed direct
contact between the attorney
and his client's adversary. Sec-
ond, conflicts of interest mar the
adversarial process by leading to
split loyalities which in turn re-
sult in the inadequate representa-
tion of one or more parties.
16
In short, it was only a matter of
time before this particular potential
conflict came before the courts, and it
should not be surprising that Justice
Liacos treated it more like the tradi-
tional conflict model than like a non-
conflict situation. Indeed, he could
have made an even stronger argument
by discussing the Code's similar rule
against an attorney directly contacting
a client of opposing counsel. 7
If White had been a disciplinary ac-
tion or a motion for a new trial in a
criminal case, one could reasonably
insist on evidence of actual prejudice
or unfairness to the client. In a dis-
qualification decision, however, the
potential for such prejudice or unfair-
ness is sufficient to justify judicial ac-
tion, because the aim is not the retro-
spective sanctioning of the attorney or
the granting of a new trial but the
prospective protection of the integrity
of the legal process itself."8 Thus it is
not a fatal flaw in the opinion that no
specific evidence of misconduct or
prejudice was presented.
Consent as a Defense
The ABA's code of professional re-
sponsibility provides a basic excep-
tion to forbidden dual representa-
tions. If it is "obvious" that the attor-
ney can adequately represent the in-
terests of both, and if each client con-
sents after "full disclosure," the attor-
ney may engage in dual representa-
tion.' 9 The August 1983 ABA Model
Rules restate the application of the
consent exception to dual representa-
tion. A lawyer cannot represent two
different clients unless:
1) The lawyer reasonably be-
lieves the representation will
not adversely affect the rela-
tionship with the other client;
and
2) Each client consents after
consultation."0
The commentary to the new model
rule explains that its wording is de-
signed to clarify the consent and "ob-
vious" requirements by allowing dual
representation with consent if "the
representation reasonably appears
not to be adversely affected by the
lawyer's other interests. "21 The
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drafters believed they were simply
restating the current requirement.
Justice Liacos' opinion can be ap-
proached from either of two roads,
which converge at the same destina-
tion. The first interpretation is that he
simply found that the representation
in this case "reasonably appear[ed]" to
affect the lawyer's other interests ad-
versely, and thus concluded that
client consent was insufficient to per-
mit the conduct. The second interpre-
tation, traveling a somewhat longer
road, is that Justice Liacos specifically
adopted the fiduciary model (by
which professionals have independ-
ent obligations to clients), as opposed
to the contract model (by which the
parties deal with each other on an
equal basis at "arm's length"), in in-
terpreting the ABA's canons. Under
the fiduciary model it is impermissi-
ble for an attorney even to ask a client
to consent to certain things. Consent-
ing to this type of arrangement may
be seen as one, forbidden as against
public policy.
There is an analogy to this view of
consent in medicine. We permit pa-
tients to consent to therapeutic mo-
dalities that are accepted medical
practice; but although necessary, the
patient's consent is not sufficient in
human experimentation. In order to
protect patients in general, and the
integrity of the research enterprise in
particular, we also require that the ex-
periment itself be "reasonable" and,
often, that it be independently re-
viewed and approved by an institu-
tional review board (IRB). 22 We add
these requirements to consent to per-
mit human experimentation (rather
than simply outlaw it) because we be-
lieve that experimentation is essential
to medical progress, and because
medical progress is highly valued by
society.
In the adversary system, on the
other hand, it is not essential that a
particular person be represented by a
particular attorney if that attorney has
a potential conflict of interest. Thus
we can protect both the client and the
system's integrity by forbidding cer-
tain dual representations outright.
"Because the attorney owes fiduciary
duties to his client," one commenta-
tor notes, "the profession can and
should place limits on the power of
the client to waive his rights beyond a
minimum level of effective assistance
and attorney loyalty.'" 3 We can ques-
tion the point at which Justice Liacos
drew this imaginary line of impro-
priety, but the appropriateness of
drawing the line itself is not at issue.
The crux of the matter turns on the
weight we attach to the interest of the
client in choosing his or her own law-
yer.
Choice of Counsel
The client's right to choice of counsel
is an important value and, in a strict
contract model of lawyer-client rela-
tionships, would determine the out-
come. In a fiduciary model, however,
choice of counsel must be limited to
counsel without conflicts of interest,
to prevent taints to the system. In the
specific area under consideration-
defense counsel in medical malprac-
tice suits-the issue of counsel selec-
tion is actually of only minor rele-
vance. As noted Boston defense law-
yer Douglas Danner comments in his
Medical Malpractice: A Primer for
Physicians, written for physicians who
are being sued for malpractice:
The typical malpractice insurance
policy gives the insurance com-
pany the right to select counsel
and control the defense. It will
select attorneys it knows to have
experience and expertise in
problems of medical malpractice
defense. You should trust your
defense counsel's advice.... In a
very real sense, regard yourself
as the 'patient"and allow your
lawyer to assume the role you
usually take. Try to conduct your-
self as you would have any pa-
tient do-give your lawyer your
respect and trust, listen well,
provide all needed information,
follow his protocol and don't try
to do his job or "treat" yourself.2 "
Two points deserve emphasis.
Since the insurance company, not the
physician, has the right to select
counsel, the individual's right to se-
lect his or her own counsel does not
even come into play. To the extent
that the insurance company can be
seen as having a right to choose a par-
ticular lawyer for a particular case,
this expectation should be out-
weighed by the necessity of protect-
ing the system's integrity. Second, if it
is typical of defense counsel to ask
their clients to act like "patients" and
"trust" them to do what is right, it can
reasonably be argued that medical
malpractice defense lawyers should
have an even higher fiduciary duty to
avoid potential conflicts of interest
than do other lawyers. Indeed, their
fiduciary responsibilities should be
similar to those of physicians; the
trust relationship with their clients
should impose high obligations re-
lated to full disclosure and actions
consistent with protecting the integ-
rity of the legal system itself. Accord-
ingly, Justice Liacos' cryptic comment
that both the lawsuits at issue in
White "involve medical malpractice"
may be much more telling than ap-
pears on the surface.
Remedies
There is no question that allegations
of conflict of interest violations have
become "common tools of litigation"
and that such allegations are capable
of "creating delay, harassment, addi-
tional expense, and perhaps even [of]
resulting in the withdrawal of a dan-
gerously competent counsel."25 The
application of Justice Liacos' opinion
will likely serve to add fuel to this
already brightly burning fire. Removal
of an attorney from a case is, of
course, unjustified when the conflict
of interest issue is raised for purely
tactical reasons.2 6 On the other hand,
where the issue goes to the integrity
of the trial itself, as Justice Liacos be-
lieved it did in White, removal is ap-
propriate: "A trial exemplifies 'proce-
dural justice': The legitimacy of the
result in large part inheres in the
process by which that result is
achieved. When a conflict of interest
threatens to 'taint the process,' the le-
gitimacy of the trial is potentially un-
dermined, a consideration that weighs
heavily in favor of disqualification." 7
The alternative of requiring the
plaintiff to obtain another expert is no
alternative at all. It is not the plain-
tiff's lawyer who has engaged in the
challenged practice, and it is not ap-
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propriate to penalize the plaintiff for
the defense counsel's conflict of in-
terest.
Conclusion
The result of White v. Kaplan is
sound, although Justice Liacos could
have articulated his rationale more
precisely and convincingly. It is likely
that the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court will follow this opinion and
expand upon it, should a similar case
reach its docket. The case does pres-
ent a problem for medical malprac-
tice defense lawyers, but it is hardly
an insurmountable one. Since lawyers
are usually chosen by insurers, those
insurers can designate another coun-
sel with little prejudice as long as
their lawyers keep adequate records
of their representation of physicians
in other relevant matters.
Disqualification can be harsh, but it
is much less harsh than disciplinary
action. Thus one can consistently con-
clude that even though no discipli-
nary action was warranted in White,
disqualification was appropriate to
protect the integrity of the bar and of
the judicial system. White v. Kaplan
can be seen as an impressionistic ba-
rometer measuring the bench and bar
view of the appropriateness of ethical
regulation, and its responsiveness to
reasonable, if debatable, judicial regu-
lation. A positive response is called
for lest "the profession's efforts at reg-
ulating itself.., be seen as hollow
doubletalk, creating safeguards that
protect clients in theory only."'
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